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No. 01-1368
NEVADA DEPARTMENT OF HUMANRESOURCES,ET AL.,
Petitioners,
v.
WILLIAM HmBS, El" AL,
Respondents.
On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari
to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit
BRIEF IN OPPOSITION
STATEMENT
1. Congress enacted the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 ("FMLA" or "Act") "to
promote the goal of equal employment opportunity for women and men, pursuant to [the Equal
Protection] clause [of the Fourteenth Amendment]." 29 U.S.C. § 2601(b)(5). Congress found
that lack of employment policies to accommodate employees' needs to care for sick family
members can force individuals into conflicts between family and job. ld. § 2601(a)(2), (a)(3).
In particular, Congress found that, "due to the nature of the roles of men and women in our
society"--roles that States supported--"the primary responsibility for family caretaking often
falls on women, and such responsibility affects the working lives of women more than it affects
the working lives of men." Id. § 2601(a)(5). The FMLA relieves women of some of the
disproportionate burden of family care by accommodating their family medical leave needs and
by making family medical leave available to men who had often been denied it based on their
sex. The Act seeks "to balance the demands of the workplace with the needsof families ... in a
2manner that, consistent with the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
minimizes the potential for employment discrimination on the basis of sex by ensuring generally
that leave is available for eligible medical reasons ... on a gender-neutral basis." Id.
§ 2601(b)(4).
The FMLA entitles eligible employees to take up to 12 work weeks of unpaid, job-
protected leave per year in certain circumstances that place extraordinary demands on families:
the birth, adoption or foster care placement of a child (subsections (A) & 03)); the need to care
for a spouse, child or parent with a serious health condition (subsection (C)); or the employee's
own serious health condition that renders him or her unable to perform the functions of the job
(subsection (D)). ld. § 2612(a)(1). Upon return to work at the conclusion of FMLA leave, an
employee must be reinstated to his or her former position or its equivalent, ld. § 2614(a). The
Act enforces those entitlements by making it unlawful to "interfere with, restrain or deny the
exercise of' FMLA rights, id. § 2615(a)(1), and prohibiting retaliation against any individual for
"opposing any practice made unlawful by this subchapter," id. § 2615(a)(2); see also 29 C.F.R. §
825.220(e) ("Individuals ... are protected from retaliation for opposing ... any practice which they
reasonably believe to be a violation of the Act or regulations.").
FMLA remedies include equitable relief such as reinstatement, damages for lost pay and
benefits or other actual monetary losses sustained (capped at an amount equal to 12 weeks of
wages or salary for the employee), interest, and fees and costs. 29 U.S.C. § 2617(a)(1)(A)(i) &
(ii), (a)(1)(B), (a)(3). If an employer cannot demonstrate that its challenged conduct was in good
faith and based on a reasonable interpretation of the Act, the employer may also be liable to the
employee for liquidated damages in an amount equal to the total actual damages plus interest.
Id. § 2617(a)(1)(A)(iii). Congress clearly expressed its intent to abrogate States' sovereign
immunity by defining covered "employers" to include "any public agency" as defined in the Fair
Labor Standards Act, id. § 203(x).
2. This case arose out of a dispute between respondent William Hibbs and petitioners,
his state employers, over whether leave other employees donated to Hibbs under Nevada's
Catastrophic Leave program ran concurrently (as petitioners contend) or consecutively (as Hibbs
contends) with the 12 weeks leave to which the federal FMLA entitled him. Petitioners' position
depends, at a minimum, on their having given Hibbs FMLA-mandated prompt, individualized
notice when he began his Catastrophic Leave that they intended to count it against his FMLA
leave entitlement. The record shows that petitioners failed to give any such notice. It further
shows that they fired him in response to his insistence that they were misreading the FMLA, and
at a time when his FMLA leave, running consecutively, had not expired. 1
Hibbs was a Welfare Eligibility Certification Specialist in the Reno District Office of the
Nevada Department of Human Resources (DHR) Welfare Division. In 1996, his wife, Dianne,
suffered a severe neck injury when the car in which she was a passenger was involved in a
collision. D. Exs. J, K, 0. 2 Surgery in October 1996 left her with acute and chronic left arm and
neck pain. By Spring of 1997, she suffered a range of serious medical complications, including
liver damage and addiction as a result of prescribed pain medication, anxiety attacks, clinical
depression, and suicidal tendencies, necessitating at one point that she be admitted to a hospital
psychiatric unit. She had a metal plate with screws in her neck from which the screws stripped
1 In reviewing a case decided on a defendants' motion for summary judgment, this Court
applies to the factual record the same standard as would the district court, crediting the plaintiff's
version of the facts insofar as a reasonable jury could so find, based on evidence in the record
and favorable inferences drawn therefrom. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio
Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 588 (1986); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c), (e).
2 "D. Ex. "refers to exhibits accompanying defendants' motion for summary judgment,
which is included in their record excerpts on appeal at CR 55.
4and loosened to the point of pressing against her esophagus, requiring her to be extremely careful
when moving her body so as to avoid a potentially fatal puncture. D. Exs. J, K, CC, DD. Her
doctors advised additional surgery and constant personal care, preferably by her husband, before
the surgery. The Hibbses scheduled the surgery for November 1997, the recommended
specialist's first available date. D. Exs. CC, DD.
In April and May, 1997, Hibbs applied for 12 weeks of unpaid FMLA leave to care for
his wife while retaining his job with the Welfare Division. D. Exs. I, J, K. His request was
granted on June 23, 1997, for FMLA leave to be taken as needed through December 1997. D.
Exs. L, M. The approval notice stated that the leave would "be counted against [his] annual
FMLA leave entitlement." Id. While his FMLA leave request was pending, Hibbs learned that
he might be eligible for paid leave under Nevada's Catastrophic Leave program, and accordingly
applied for such leave on June 2, 1991. D. Ex. D. Under the Catastrophic Leave program,
employees with accrued, unused annual or sick leave may donate it to other employees to permit
them to take paid leave in specified circumstances, including an immediate family member's
serious illness or accident. NEV. REv. STAT. 284.362 to 284.3629. Qualifying employees may
request up to a maximum of 26 weeks, or 6 months, of catastrophic leave in a calendar year.
NEV. REV. STAT. 284.3622. Hibbs preferred to use Nevada Catastrophic Leave first, and save
his unpaid federal FMLA leave for when paid leave donations were no longer available. P. Ex. 1
(Hibbs Aft. _ 9). 3 Hibbs received leave pledges from other employees and obtained approvals
for approximately nine and a half weeks of catastrophic leave. D. Exs. O, T.4
3 "P. Ex. ___"refers to exhibits to plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment, which
appear at Tab D in plaintiff-appellant's exercpts of record on appeal.
4 His request for paid catastrophic leave was initially approved on August 1 I, 1997, for up
to 5 weeks of paid leave, D. Ex. O, and an additional 4 1/2weeks of paid catastrophic leave was
approved on September 17, 1997, D. Ex. T. Although the second request was approved for 4 1/2
5Hibbs had started taking unpaid FMLA leave intermittently after June 23, when his
FMLA leave request was approved, and he started taking such leave full time after August 5.
See Pet. App. 2a. When his first paid Catastrophic Leave grant took effect on August 11, see D.
Exs. P, N, he had already used approximately 3 weeks of FMLA leave, with approximately 9
weeks of unpaid FMLA leave remaining. The Catastrophic Leave donations allowed Hibbs to be
on full-time paid leave from August 11 until mid-October, when he expected to be able to rely on
his remaining unpaid FMLA leave to carry him through his wife's late-November surgery and
initial recuperation.
The FMLA permits employers to require their employees to "substitute any of the
accrued paid vacation leave, personal leave, ... family leave [or medical or sick leave] of the
employee for leave provided under subparagraph ... (C)." 29 U.S.C. § 2612(d)(2)(A). The
employer may only count those forms of paid leave as FMLA leave, however, if the employer
gives the employee advance notice of its intent to do so "within one or two business days [after
notice of the need for leave is given] if feasible." 29 C.F.R. §§ 825.208(a), 825.301(c). See
generally Ragsdale v. Wolverine World Wide, Inc., 122 S. Ct. 1155 (2002). Hibbs had no
advance notice, however, that his employers would seek to count his use of donated Catastrophic
Leave against his entitlement to 12 weeks of unpaid FMLA leave, s
weeks of leave (180 hours), only 144 hours of leave had been donated specifically for his use,
leaving him 36 hours short. D. Ex. W. The DHR Director's Office approved the additional 36
hours out of the Department's Catastrophic Leave account on October 15, 1997. D. Ex. Z.
5 The court of appeals erroneously stated that Hibbs "'was informed that the [catastrophic
leave] would 'be counted against [his] annual FMLA leave entitlement,'" Pet. App. 2a, when in
fact the phrase the court quotes appears only on the form approving Hibbs' first request, for 12
weeks of unpaid FMLA leave, and specifies that that leave would be counted against his annual
FMLA leave entitlement. D. Ex. R. Petitioners nonetheless suggest that that form gave Hibbs
adequate notice that the Catastrophic Leave would run concurrently with his FMLA leave. In
support of their claim that they gave notice, they also point to (1) two boi!erplate reminders
regarding filling out Biweekly Time and Attendance sheets (BTAs) to "Be sure to use the
6An October 10, 1997, letter from petitioners informed respondent that his "FMLA leave
of 12 weeks has been fulfilled," and that all donated catastrophic leave hours would be exhausted
by October 13. D. Ex. X.6 The letter concluded: "Welfare personnel is requiring an updated
physician notice explaining your wife's diagnosis, prognosis and need for your presence no later
than October 15, 1997. At that time you will need to decide whether your intent is to return back
to work or reapply for additional catastrophic leave." Id. Hibbs provided an updated doctors'
certification and on October 15 requested 200 more hours of paid catastrophic leave, D. Ex. AA,
seeking full-time paid leave until late November. On October 21, the Welfare Division approved
it and sent it to the Office of the Director of the Nevada Department of Human Resources for
final signature. Id. The remaining unpaid leave, if used consecutively with that additional
Catastrophic Leave, would have covered Hibbs until late January, 1998.
Believing that he had additional paid Catastrophic Leave and should still be able to use
the balance of his unpaid FMLA leave when the Catastrophic Leave expired, Hibbs initiated a
meeting on November 3, 1997, with petitioner Firpo and his immediate supervisor, Sue Schultz.
Hibbs updated them on his wife's health problems, including his plans to take her to the
appropriate codes when recording your FMLA CATASTROPHIC leave, ANNUAL (FMAL),
SICK (FMS), FAMILY SICK (FMFS), CATASTROPHIC (FMCL), LWOP (FMLP)," Exs. Q,
U; and (2) a memo stating "[i]f you do not want to use 40 hours per week of Catastrophic Leave,
your BTA should reflect FMLP for the hours not covered by the Catastrophic Leave," Ex. P; see
Def.'s Mot. Summ. J. at 4; D. App. Br. at 8. Those documents did not notify Hibbs that
petitioners would count his Catastrophic Leave against his FMLA leave entitlement. (Moreover,
when an employee is on leave from work, his employer ordinarily is the person who fills out and
submits the BTAs, and that practice was followed with respect to Hibbs when he was on leave.
P. Ex. 2 at 93 (Perwein Dep. 43). Hibbs filled out no BTAs after July 25, 1997.) In any event,
the court of appeals did not specify when notice was given, and the issue of whether or when any
notice was given remains unresolved in this preliminary posture.
6 Once the missing 36 hours of the 180 hours approved on September 17 was obtained
from the leave bank, Hibbs apparently had an additional 4 1/2 days of approved, paid leave, i.e.
until October 20. See supra n. 4.
7specialist in Arizona for surgery within the coming weeks. D. Ex. CC. 7 He also stated his hope
to be available to return to work by January 5, 1998, D. Ex. CC, DD, and he explained that his
only expectation was to be able to take his unpaid leave and return to his job. That expectation
was based on Hibbs' belief that if he started his remaining unpaid leave when his paid leave ran
out, that would provide the remaining time he needed. See D. Exs. CC, DD; P. Ex. 1 (Hibbs Aft.
tl[_9, 12). Petitioner Firpo told him she would review the available information and options, and
assured him that he would be given "ample notice of any decision taken by Nevada State
Welfare." D. Ex. CC.
The situation abruptly changed following the November 3 meeting. On November 5,
petitioners retracted their support of the Catastrophic Leave upon which Hibbs was then relying,
recalling the papers from the Director's Office where they were awaiting final approval. See D.
Ex. AA (handwritten notation). On November 6, petitioner Firpo personally delivered to Hibbs'
home a letter stating that "[n]o additional catastrophic leave or leave without pay will be
granted," asserting that "[i]t is time for you to make other arrangements for your wife's care,"
and requiring him to report to work on November 12 or face disciplinary action. D. Ex. EE. On
November 7 at 7:50 a.m., Hibbs called petitioner Firpo to say that his wife's surgery was
imminent, and that he doubted he could return to work on November 12. D. Ex. FF. Firpo
insisted that no more time off would be authorized, ld. When Firpo delivered a written
reprimand to Hibbs on November 13, Hibbs reiterated his understanding that he still had unpaid
FMLA leave and asked what had happened to that leave. P. Ex. 1 (Hibbs Aff. _ 11); D. Exs. GG,
HH. Firpo said that she could not answer leave questions. P. Ex. 1 (Hibbs Aft. ][ 11). Hibbs
7 Hibbs' affidavit identifies the date of the meeting as November 6, whereas Firpo's and
Schultz's file memos date it as November 3. See P. Ex. 1 (Hibbs Aft. _][8, 12); D. Ex. CC, DD.
For current purposes, we assume that the meeting took place on November 3.
8responded that his wife's condition had not improved, and that he wished to use his unpaid
FMLA leave. Id. (_[12).
On December 5, petitioner Firpo recommended Hibbs' dismissal for having been "absent
without leave" since November 12, D. Ex. 11,and the dismissal became effective on December
22, 1997, Pet. App. 3a. After a postponement while her husband prepared for and participated in
a hearing relating to his dismissal, see Pet. App. 3a, Dianne Hibbs underwent surgery in Arizona
around the end of 1997.
3. On April 20, 1998, Hibbs filed suit in federal district court against the Nevada
Department of Human Resources, its director, Charlotte Crawford, 8 and the Director of the DHR
Welfare Division, Nikki Firpo. Hibbs claimed that petitioners violated the FMLA by retaliating
against him when he opposed their efforts retroactively to count his catastrophic leave against his
FMLA leave, and for firing him when he was on approved, unexpired FMLA leave. 9 Hibbs
sought back pay, damages, declaratory and injunctive relief including reinstatement, interest,
fees and costs, and all other appropriate relief. On petitioners' motion for summary judgment,
the district court ruled from the bench that Hibbs' FMLA claim was barred by the State's
sovereign immunity. Pet. App. 47a-58a.
4. The United States intervened on appeal to defend the constitutionality of retrospective
relief in private actions against state employers who violate 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(C), and the
court of appeals reversed the grant of summary judgment for petitioners on the FMLA claim. In
a unanimous opinion, the court held that Congress, in authorizing family medical leave, had
clearly expressed its intent to abrogate the States' Eleventh Amendment immunity, Pet. App. 8a-
8 By the time Hibbs filed his Complaint, Crawford had replaced the previous Director,
Myla Florence.
9 He also asserted federal due process and state law claims that are not at issue here.
9a, and that it had the authority to do so under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment in order to
remedy and prevent unconstitutional sex discrimination, Pet. App. 12a-42a. The court first
underscored that, in contrast to its deferential approach to age or disability discrimination, this
Court's heightened standard of equal protection review of sex-based discrimination should
correspond to a decreased burden on Congress to demonstrate its grounds for identifying an
equal protection problem warranting remediation and deterrence pursuant to its section 5
authority. Pet. App. 17a-19a. The court went on to find that the legislative history showed
"widespread intentional gender discrimination by states," whose "discriminatory leave policies
are just the sort of difficult and intractable problem that justifies broad prophylactic measures in
response." Pet. App. 21a. Alternatively, the court found ample support for the FMLA's
remedial character in the fact that it was "designed to undo the impact of [a] history of state-
supported and mandated sex discrimination as it continues to affect public and private
employment." Pet. App. 23a.
The court of appeals concluded that the FMLA is a congruent and proportional response
to States' unconstitutional sex discrimination because the Act "focuses on only one type of
policy," family leave, the guarantee of which Congress concluded would be a "a modest step"
toward counteracting sex discrimination by state and non-state employers alike. Pet. App. 40a.
The court reasoned that a sex-neutral remedy, rather than one targeted only at women, is
congruent and proportional because the discrimination affects both sexes. A sex-neutral solution
both avoids unconstitutionally benefiting women alone based on over-broad generalizations that
men do not also need family medical leave, and blunts incentives to discriminate against women
born of expectations that they will take more leave than men. ld. at 36a-40a. Further, the court
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concluded that "the statute protects job security, not wage continuation," and thus "is not
principally concerned with providing an economic benefit." Id. at 40a.
The court of appeals accordingly reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings.
The remand order included respondent's FMLA claim against the State, as well as his FMLA
claims against the individual defendants seeking reinstatement under Ex Parte Young. Pet. App.
43a-44a & n.32, 46a. Petitioners did not seek panel or en banc rehearing. The panel granted
petitioners' motion to stay the court of appeals' mandate, over respondent's opposition.
REASONS FOR DENYING THE PETITION
The petition should be denied as unripe. Petitioners seek interlocutory review of a
constitutional question that might be avoided if the case were permitted to proceed to final
judgment. The question petitioners present would be moot if Hibbs were to recover on his
retaliation theory because the validity of 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(2), barring retaliation against
employees for opposing practices the FMLA makes unlawful, is appropriate section 5 legislation
enforcing the First Amendment without regard to whether the grant of family medical leave in
section 2612(a)(1)(C) is appropriate as remedial and prophylactic equal protection legislation.
The question presented could equally prove moot on other grounds suggested but not fully
developed in the record.
The only reason petitioners offer for granting immediate review in the face of those
contingencies is the need for clarity about whether the States must comply with the FMLA, but
whether private actions for damages are available to enforce section 2612(a)(1)(C) will not alter
the indisputable legal obligation of Nevada and every other State in the Ninth Circuit to comply
with that provision. Immediate review also would have little or no effect on the State of
Nevada's litigation burdens, because Hibbs' Ex Parte Young claim against the individual
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government officials for reinstatement necessitates litigation of the merits of his claim of
violation of section 2612(a)(1)(C) in any event, and his retaliation claim entitles him to seek the
full amount of his damages directly against the State. In contrast to the negligible burdens denial
of review would impose on the State, Hibbs would suffer from the delay of litigating in this
Court while the lower court's mandate is stayed. He has already pressed this case for more than
four years in the lower courts while awaiting reinstatement to his job, yet his entitlement even to
non-damages relief has been stayed pending resolution of the petition.
Given the benefits of further litigation in the lower courts and the absence of need for
immediate review, the negligible conflict between the decision below and a lone contrary
appellate case does not warrant this Court's exercise of its discretionary certiorari jurisdiction--
especially given that the decision below correctly upholds a provision of federal law entitled to a
strong presumption of constitutionality. This Court should deny the petition and permit the case
to be litigated to final judgment, at which time both the necessity, if any, of deciding the
constitutional question and the context for doing so will be clear.
I. CERTIORARI SHOULD BE DENIED IN LIGHT OF STRONG REASONS TO
AVOID PREMATURE DECISION OF A CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTION THAT
MAY BE AVOIDABLE, AND THE LACK OF NEED FOR INTERLOCUTORY
REVIEW BY THIS COURT.
The petition is unripe because petitioners seek this Court's review of a non-final order
remanding the case. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen v. Bangor & Aroostook
R.R. Co., 389 U.S. 327, 328 (1967) (citing Hamilton-Brown Shoe Co. v. Wolf Bros., 240 U.S.
251,257-58 (1916)). 1° The principle that sovereign immunity claims ordinarily are resolved at
lo See American Constr. Co. v. Jacksonville, Tampa & Key West Ry. Co., 148 U.S. 372, 384
(1893) (Supreme Court ordinarily should not review interlocutory decision "unless [immediate
review] is necessary to prevent extraordinary inconvenience and embarrassment to the conduct
of the cause."); Robert L. Stem et al., Supreme Court Practice § 2.2, at/_0 (7th ed. 1993)
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the outset of litigation, see Puerto Rico Aqueduct & Sewer Authority v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc.,
506 U.S. 139 (1993), does not support a discretionary grant of certiorari to review the
interlocutory order in this case. Instead, because further proceedings would allow potentially
informative record clarification lj and may render petitioners' constitutional question moot, the
doctrine of constitutional avoidance strongly supports denying the petition. _2 There are any
number of ways in which the question presented in the petition could become moot. 13 In
(discussing ordinary practice of "declin[ing] to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction to review
judgments that are not final").
11 For example, one equal protection basis Congress identified supporting enactment of the
FMLA was the discrimination that occurred when leave decisions were made on a case-by-case
basis at employers' sole discretion. See infra Point l/I. Explication in this ease of facts relevant
to that problem could provide the Court with a more concrete appreciation of relevant dynamics.
Potentially relevant facts might be the circumstances of employees similarly situated to Hibbs
whom petitioners permitted to use different types of leave consecutively while Hibbs was denied
the ability to do so.
x2 This Court should not "anticipate a question of constitutional law in advance of the
necessity of deciding it." Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 346 (1936)
(Brandeis, J. concurring); see id. at 347 ("[I]f a case can be decided on either of two grounds, one
involving a constitutional question, the other a question of statutory construction or general law,
the Court will decide only the latter."); Lyng v. Nothwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485
U.S. 439, 445 (1988) ("A fundamental and longstanding principle of judicial restraint requires
that courts avoid reaching constitutional questions in advance of necessity of deciding them.");
Spector Motor Serv. v. McLaughlin, 323 U.S. 101, 105 (1944) ("If there is one doctrine more
deeply rooted than any other in the process of constitutional adjudication, it is that we ought not
pass on questions of constitutionality.., unless such adjudication is unavoidable.").
13 This Court's recent decision in Ragsdale v. Wolverine World Wide, Inc., 122 S. Ct. 1155
(2002), which altered the remedial inquiry for claims (like Hibbs') of lack of notice that another
form of leave is being counted against the FMLA leave entitlement, could conceivably eliminate
Hibbs' claim for retrospective relief. The damages claim appears likely to survive Ragsdale.
First, it is not at all clear, even if notice had been given, that the FMLA would permit
substitution of Catastrophic Leave donated by other employees. The statute only authorizes
substitution of "any of the accrued paid vacation leave, personal leave, family leave [or medical
or sick leave] of the employee," 29 U.S.C. § 2612(d)(2)(A), and Catastrophic Leave donated by
other employees does not clearly qualify as "accrued ... family [or medical] leave ... of the
employee." Second, although the record on the point is undeveloped, Hibbs seems likely to be
able to satisfy the Ragsdale requirement of proof of actual harm caused by petitioners' failure to
give the required notice, such as by showing "that []he would have taken less leave or
13
particular, if Hibbs were to receive full monetary relief under his First Amendment retaliation
theory, that would moot the need to decide the question presented here.
A. Congress's Clear Authority To Ban Retaliation for First Amendment-
Protected Employee Speech Fully Supports the Judgment Below and Makes
Immediate Decision of Petitioners' Broader Section 5 Question
Inappropriate.
Even if section 2612(a)(1)(C) of the FMLA is supported only by the Commerce Clause
and not by section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, the State is properly subject to suit for all of
the retrospective relief Hibbs seeks. No meaningful protection of the State's dignitary interest
would be attained by granting the petition. Cf. Puerto Rico Aqueduct, 506 U.S. at 146. That is
because, whether or not section 2612(a)(1)(C) of the FMLA has section 5 support, Congress has
section 5 power to enforce public employee speech rights against retaliatory discharge through a
separate provision of the FMLA, section 2615(a)(2). Under the FMLA, it is unlawful for any
employer to "interfere with, restrain, or deny the exercise of or the attempt to exercise" FMLA
rights such as by firing an employee because he is on subsection (C) FMLA family medical
leave, 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(1), and it is unlawful to "discharge or in any manner discriminate
against any individual for opposing any practice made unlawful" by the FMLA such as by firing
an employee for opposing the employer's erroneous interpretation of the FMLA, id. §
2615(a)(2); 29 C.F.R. § 825.220(e). Here, in addition to contending that petitioners interfered
with his exercise of FMLA rights by firing him when he was on leave, in violation of section
2615(a)(1), Hibbs also claims that they retaliated against him when, starting at the November 3
intermittent leave if [he] had received the required notice." See Ragsdale, 122 S. Ct. at 1161-63.
The Court should deny review at this stage to allow such contingencies to be resolved. The
constitutional question petitioners present "ought not be decided except in an actual factual
setting that makes such a decision necessary." Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 10 (1988)
(quoting Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 294-95
(1981)).
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meeting, he voiced his opposition to petitioners' unlawful reading of the FMLA. That alleged
retaliation, if true, constituted a violation of section 2615(a)(2). And this retaliation-for-
opposition provision of the FMLA has targeted section 5 support based on the First Amendment
that is distinct from the overlapping but broader equal protection ground on which the court
below relied. 14
The FMLA's authorization of retrospective relief against state employers who engage in
such retaliation is at the core of Congress's power under section 5 to enforce the First
Amendment's Free Speech Clause through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. FMLA retaliation claims generally, and Hibbs' in particular, are based on conduct
that is protected by the First Amendment Freedom of Speech Clause as this Court has interpreted
it. This Court's cases prohibit retaliation against public employees for nondisruptive speech on
matters of public concern. Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 573-574 (1968); Connick
v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 155 (1983). Even employee speech that is motivated by a desire to
defeat adverse employment action may still address matters of public concern. See Connick, 461
U.S. at 141,150 (concluding that some of the matters that employee raised in an effort to avoid
being transferred were issues of public concern); Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 386, 397-398
(1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasizing distinction between motive for and content of
employees' remark). First Amendment protection "is not lost to the public employee who
14 There is a genuine factual issue as to whether petitioners fired Hibbs in retaliation for his
opposition to their interpretation of the FMLA. It was at the November 3 meeting that Hibbs
first asserted to his supervisors, Sue Schultz and petitioner Nikki Firpo, that the FMLA, as he
understood it, required FMLA leave to run consecutively and not concurrently with other forms
of leave. See D. Ex. CC, DD; P. Ex. 1 (Hibbs Aft. _[tl[9, 12). The sequence of adverse actions
against Hibbs immediately following the November 3 meeting, culminating in Hibbs' discharge,
raises an inference of retaliatory motive on petitioners' part that a factfinder would be permitted
to credit. See Clark County Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 273 (2001) (close temporal
15
arranges to communicate privately with his employer rather than to spread his views before the
public." Givhan v. Western Line Consol. Sch. Dist., 439 U.S. 410, 415-16 (1979); see Rankin,
483 U.S. at 387 n.11 ("The private nature of the statement does not ... vitiate the status of the
statement as addressing a matter of public concern."); Connick, 461 U.S. at 152-54.15 Here, just
as in Givhan, what is at stake is an employee assertion, made privately to a supervisor in the
context of a disputed personnel action, that an employer was violating important federal fights.
Hibbs' statements, and employees' stated opposition to unlawful employer practices generally,
are matters of public concern under this Court's precedents.
The FMLA's anti-retaliation protection is purely remedial, analogous to the legislation
prohibiting race-based juror qualification that this Court sustained in Ex Parte Virginia, 100 U.S.
(10 Otto) 339 (1879), and not to the broader, prophylactic legislation at issue in Garrett, Kimel,
Florida Prepaid and Boerne, and is thus per se congruent and proportional. It is only when a
statute prohibits "a broader swath of conduct" than is barred by this Court's constitutional cases
that a detailed congruence and proportionality analysis is needed to discern whether the statute is
appropriate Fourteenth Amendment legislation. 16 In order to sustain the FMLA's anti-retaliation
proximity between employer's awareness of protected activity and adverse employment action
can give rise to an inference of retaliatory motive).
i5 Opposition to practices that the FMLA makes unlawful is more than mere "complaint
about a change in the employee's own duties," United States v. National Treasury Employees
Union, 513 U.S. 454, 466 (1995), or garden-variety "criticism directed at a public official,"
Connick, 461 U.S. at 149. Congress is well within its section 5 power in treating criticism of the
states' administration of federal civil rights laws as a matter of public concern for First
Amendment purposes.
16 Cf. Board of Trustees of University of Alabama at Birmingham v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356,
365 (2001) (section 5 legislation "reaching beyond the scope of § l's actual guarantees must
exhibit" congruence and proportionality."); City ofBoerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997)
("preventive rules" are appropriate remedial measures only where there is "a congruence
between the means used and the ends to be achieved").
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remedy, there is no need to approve a protective buffer zone around state employees' First
Amendment rights, so no special showing of any pattern of violations need be made.
Although the court of appeals, in sustaining section 2612(a)(1)(C), did not analyze the
distinct question of Congress's section 5 authority to enforce public employees' constitutional
right to free speech by providing remedies against unlawful retaliation, its decision was valid on
that alternative section 5 ground. Hibbs has consistently pressed his retaliation theory, and there
is no question of waiver. 17 The First Amendment retaliation theory of Congress's section 5
power is not, however, itself ripe for review on certiorari in the absence of any circuit conflict, is
That alternative rationale justifying Hibbs' damages claim instead underscores both the lack of
any pressing need to decide petitioners' question at this time, and the awkwardness of this case
as a vehicle for review of that question. Were this Court to grant review, it would be faced with
17 As the prevailing party, Hibbs is "of course free to defend [his] judgment on any ground
properly raised below whether or not that ground was relied upon, rejected or even considered by
the district court or the court of appeals." Washington v. Yakima Indian Nation, 439 U.S. 463,
476 n.20 (1979). Respondent has properly raised this claim. He has alleged retaliation as a basis
for his FMLA claim in his complaint, see Complaint _[34, and he has consistently pursued his
retaliation theory in the trial court, see, e.g., Pl.'s Mot. for Partial Summ. J. at 16, and on appeal,
see, e.g., Plaintiff-Appellant's Br. (10/14/99) at 8, 19, 22, 24. The distinct argument that the
FMLA retaliation provision is valid under section 5 as enforcement of First Amendment speech
rights is "not a new claim within the meaning of that rule, but a new argument to support what
has been [respondent's] consistent claim," and is thus not subject to waiver. Lebron v. National
R.R. Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374, 379 (1995); see Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519,
534 (1992) ("Once a federal claim is properly presented, a party can make any argument in
support of that claim; parties are not limited to the precise arguments they made below.").
18 The only lower courts to have considered this argument have at least provisionally
credited it. See Roberts v. Pennsylvania Dep 't of Public Welfare, No. Civ.A.99-3836, 2002 WL
253945 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 20, 2002) (holding that provision of Americans with Disabilities Act that
forbids an employer from taking adverse action against an employee for "opposing any act or
practice made unlawful" by the ADA is valid §5 legislation to enforce First Amendment); cf.
Rhode Island Dep't ofEnvtl. Mgmt. v. United States, 286 F.3d 27, 42 (lst Cir. 2002) (viewing as
"colorable" an argument that an environmental statute's whistleblower protection was "enacted
to safeguard First Amendment rights that have long been made applicable to states through the
Fourteenth Amendment," and dismissing claim on other grounds).
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the unattractive choice of either considering the alternative theory before the courts of appeals
have had an opportunity to do so, or rendering a decision limited to petitioners' question
presented that may well become moot if Hibbs ultimately prevails on the alternative retaliation
ground. For all these reasons, the petition should be denied.
B. Denying the Petition Will Not Affect the State's Legal Obligation To Comply
with the FMLA or Burden the State with Unnecessary Litigation.
The only reason petitioners offer in support of immediate review at this interlocutory
stage of the litigation is that the decision creates legal "uncertainty" that is a "hindrance" to the
"hiring and firing practices" of States in the Ninth Circuit. Pet. 15. But, contrary to petitioners'
assertions, id., the decision below has no effect on whether state officials are "free to fire"
employees for exercising their FMLA rights. Petitioners' section 5 challenge affects only the
availability of judicially ordered retrospective relief against States, not the legal standards
governing States' primary conduct. Even were petitioners to prevail on their sovereign immunity
defense, they would not be relieved of their legal obligation under the Supremacy Clause to
comply with the FMLA, which is indisputably valid as Commerce Clause legislation applicable
to government and private employers alike. See U.S. Const. art. VI, el. 2; Alden v. Maine, 527
U.S. 706, 732 (1999) ("When a State asserts its immunity to suit, the question is not the primacy
of federal law but the implementation of the law in a manner consistent with the constitutional
sovereignty of the States."); Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
The FMLA is enforceable not only through private actions, but also in administrative or civil
actions by the Secretary of Labor, 29 U.S.C. § 2617(a), (b), in which the availability of monetary
relief is unaffected by the scope of Congress's section 5 power.
The availability of retrospective relief also, as a practical matter, has virtually no impact
on the litigation burdens the petitioners must face in federal court. Respondent has live claims
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for prospective injunctive relief under Ex Parte Young against supervisory employees, petitioners
Nikki Firpo and Charlotte Crawford, which the court of appeals included in its remand and
petitioners do not challenge here. Pet. App. 42a-44a & n. 32.19 Petitioners' sovereign immunity
defense has no bearing on Hibbs' claims for prospective relief, including reinstatement, fees and
costs against state officials. See Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908); Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S.
678, 695 (1978). Litigation of the Ex Parte Young claims involves the same witnesses, the same
evidence, and the same trial on the merits as litigation of the damages claim. Indeed, under
respondent's First Amendment retaliation theory, the amount of monetary relief would also have
to be determined, even if 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(C) did not validly abrogate the State's
sovereign immunity. See supra Point I.A.
II. PETITIONERS VASTLY OVERSTATE THE EXTENT OF THE CONFLICT
AMONG THE CIRCUITS, WHICH DOES NOT WARRANT IMMEDIATE
RESOLUTION BY THIS COURT.
The circuit conflict is minimal and, especially in view of the strong reasons to avoid
interlocutory review in this case, see supra Point I, the issue should be left to percolate further in
the courts of appeals before this Court reviews it. The petition is limited to the question whether
a damages remedy for States' violations of 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(C) is appropriate legislation
under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, and petitioners assert that the court of appeals
decision sustaining that remedy conflicts with decisions of eight other circuits and one state high
court. See Pet. 8. As the court of appeals pointed out and petitioners acknowledge, however,
virtually all of the courts that have held that section 5 fails to support FMLA retrospective relief
19 The court below apparently erred in believing that the availability of relief under Ex
Parte Young depends on whether the defendant officials are "employers" under the FMLA, Pet.
App. 44a n.32, because "the inquiry into whether suit lies under Ex Parte Young does not include
an analysis of the merits of the claim." Verizon Maryland lnc. v. Public Util. Comm'n of
Maryland, 535 U.S. __, slip op. at 10 (May 20, 2002).
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against state employers have done so in the context of claims under a different statutory
provision from the one at issue here, i.e., section 2612(a)(1)(D) regarding personal medical leave
as opposed to section 2612(a)(1)(C) regarding family medical leave. 2° "The difference matters,"
the court of appeals explained, because the family medical leave provisions are more clearly "an
attempt to remedy gender discrimination." Pet. App. 6a; see also Laro v. New Hampshire, 259
F.3d 1, 9 (lst Cir. 2001) (expressly limiting holding to section 2612(a)(1)(D), because "[th]e
constitutional arguments in support of the remaining provisions have greater strength and raise
issues (for instance, their implications for family roles) not at issue here"); Hale v. Mann, 219
F.3d 61, 69 (2d Cir. 2000) (expressly limiting holding to the personal medical leave provision);
Garrett, 193 F.3d at 1219 (opinion limited to "the provision at issue here," i.e. section
2612(a)(1)(D)); see generally Garrett, 531 U.S. at 360 n.1 (finding no section 5 support for ADA
Title I, but declining to address adequacy of such support for ADA Title I1). Indeed, some of the
decisions invalidating retrospective relief under subsection (D) expressly contrast its invalidity
with the apparent validity of subsection (C) and thus accord rather than conflict with the court of
appeals' decision at issue here. 21 The Department of Justice makes the same distinction, having
20 See Laro v. New Hampshire, 259 F.3d 1, 11 (lst Cir. 2001); Lizzi v. Alexander, 255 F.3d
128, 131,135 (4th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 812 (2002); Townsel v. Missouri, 233 F.3d
1094, 1096 (8th Cir. 2000); Chittister v. Department of Cmty. & Econ. Dev., 226 F.3d 223, 229
(3d Cir. 2000); Sims v. Univ. of Cincinnati, 219 F.3d 559, 566 (6th Cir. 2000); Hale v. Mann,
219 F.3d 61, 69 (2d Cir. 2000); Garrett v. University of Ala. at Birmingham Bd. of Trustees, 193
F.3d 1214, 1220 (11th Cir. 1999), rev'd on other grounds, 531 U.S. 356 (2001); Schall v.
Wichita State Univ., 7 P.3d 1144, 1162 (Kan. 2000); bat see Thomson v. Ohio State Univ. Hosp.,
238 F.3d 424, 2000 WL 1721038 (6th Cir. 2000) (unpublished disposition); Kazmier v.
Widmann, 225 F.3d 519 (5th Cir. 2000).
21 See Laro, 259 F.3d at 12 (identifying sex discrimination that "provides a rationale for the
parental and family-care leave provisions," and observing that a legislative record deficient with
respect to personal medical leave does document discrimination "with respect to parental leave ...
and perhaps leave to care for family members"); see also Garren 193 F.3d at 1220 (personal
medical leave provision, in contrast to the other FMLA provisions, derives no support from
suggestions that the FMLA is designed to "protect women from discrimination due to issues
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declined to defend the constitutionality of subsection (D) damages against state employers, while
actively defending the same remedy here and in other subsection (C) cases. 22
Only two courts of appeals (in addition to the Ninth Circuit in this case) have considered
whether employees may recover retrospective relief against States pursuant to 29 U.S.C.
§ 2612(a)(1)(C). See Thomson, 238 F.3d 424; Kazmier v. Widmann, 225 F.3d 519 (5th Cir.
2000). Thomson, however, was an unpublished, per curiam opinion. Under the Sixth Circuit's
own rules, "citation of unpublished decisions in briefs and oral arguments" is disfavored, "except
for the purpose of establishing res judicata, estoppel, or law of the case." l.x_al Rule 28(g).
Sixth Circuit unpublished opinions therefore have little, if any, precedential value. See id.; see
also United States v. Smithers, 212 F.3d 303,323 (6th Cir. 2000); Hall v. Shipley, 932 F.2d 1147,
1151 (6th Cir. 1991). Thomson thus does not create a circuit conflict calling for this Court's
resolution.
Thus, as the court below recognized, only the divided panel decision in Kazmier is at
odds with the decision in this case. The Kazmier panel concluded, over a strong dissent by Judge
Dennis, that FMLA subections (C) and (D) do not validly abrogate state sovereign immunity. 23
regarding pregnancy, child care, and care taking of family members"). The thoughtful dissenting
opinions in those cases further explain the validity of subsection (C). See Laro, 259 F.3d at 17
(Lipez, J., dissenting); Garren, 193 F.3d at 1220 (Cook, J., dissenting).
22 See Letters from Theodore B. Olson to J. Dennis Hastert, Speaker of the House of
Representatives, and Richard B. Cheney, President of the Senate re: Bates v. Indiana Dep't of
Corrections, No. IPO1-1159-C-H/G (S.D. Ind.) (Dec. 20, 2001) (communicating Solicitor
General's decision not to defend 29 U.S.C. 2612(a)(1)(D) as appropriate section 5 legislation but
reserving judgment as to other subsections) (letters lodged with the Court); Brief for the United
States as Intervenor-Appellant in Bylsma v. Davis, No. 01-16102-A (llth Cir. flied April 9,
2002) (defending 29 U.S.C. 2612(a)(1)(C) as appropriate section 5 legislation).
23 The fact that the Fifth Circuit in Kazmier engaged in a distinct subsection (C) analysis,
rather than simply relying on its subsection (D) analysis as dispositive with respect to both
provisions, supports the conclusion of the court below (Pet. App. 5a-6a) that the cases dealing
only with subsection (D) raise distinct section 5 issues and thus do not conflict with the decision
21
Even where the lower courts are in clear conflict, this Court often defers consideration of novel
questions of law to permit further development. The conflict between the decision below and a
single, divided decision from another circuit is not a sufficient reason to warrant this Court's
review here. 24 The inappropriateness of review at this time is highlighted by the lack of a final
order, indicating that the issue petitioners raise may not be dispositive and that the record
remains unsettled. See supra Point I. The prudent course is thus to deny the petition at this time.
IlL TIlE DECISION BELOW IS CORRECT.
Section 2612(a)(1)(C) of the FMLA is a nuanced and limited measure seeking to remedy
and deter States' unconstitutional sex discrimination, and is thus a valid exercise of Congress's
power under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Petitioners' request for summary reversal is
utterly inappropriate, and both it and the request for plenary review should be denied.
Section 2612(a)(1)(C) addresses a familiar and lamentable sex discrimination problem in
the job market today: States frequently act on 1he assumption that a woman is more likely than a
man to need time away from work to care for her family. This assumption is almost always
unspoken, is usually not intended to signal any disrespect for either sex, and is exceedingly
difficult to prove. Moreover, as the court of appeals explained, it has long roots in past, overt,
sex-based state policies that "treat[ed] women as non-essential workers, with principal
below regarding subsection (C). See Kazmier, 225 F.3d at 525 ("[W]e discern no reason why the
provisions of one of the FMLA's subsections could not validly abrogate the States' Eleventh
Amendment immunity even if the provisions of some or all of the remaining subsections fail to
do so.")
24 It remains unclear whether even this minimal conflict may resolve itself without this
Court's intervention. Given that the Fifth Circuit has yet to speak en banc on the issue, the law
could ultimately crystalize in a subsequent case in that court in conformity with the views of
Judge Dennis in Kazmier and the Ninth Circuit in this case. Cf., e.g., United States v. Singleton,
165 F.3d 1297 (10th Cir. 1999) (en bane) (reversing panel decision and thereby eliminating
circuit conflict regarding whether the United States is covered by reference to "whoever" in 18
U.S.C. § 201(c)(2)).
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responsibility for the family." Pet. App. 23a. As a generalization about current average
tendencies of women and men, it may be a factually accurate one. But state decisions based on
the assumption that, because of sex, a woman is more likely than a man to want and/or need to
be away from work to take care of her family plainly violate equal protection as this Court has
interpreted it.
This Court's cases skeptically scrutinize and presumptively reject any state decision
based on sex, including those based on overbroad notions about the capacities and preferences of
men and women. See generally United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996). This Court
has repeatedly recognized the pervasive part that sex-role stereotypes have played in maintaining
inequality between men and women, and has been vigilant in striking down States' actions that
are predicated on notions that a woman's place is in the home. See, e.g., Wengler v. Druggists
Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142 (1980); Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S.
645 (1972). When States treat female and male employees differently due to sex-based
assumptions that they will have differential responsibilities in staying home to care for sick
family members, they violate the Equal Protection Clause as this Court has interpreted it. Such
sex-based generalizations are constitutionally forbidden even when they intend no disrespect of
women, see Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 725 (1982); Orr, 440 U.S. at
283, and even where as a general matter they may be factually supported, see Virginia, 518 U.S.
at 542; J.E.B.v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 139 n.ll (1994); id. at 149 (O'Connor, J., concurring),
Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 201 (1976); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 645 (1975).
One equal protection problem to which section 2612(a)(1)(C) responded was the
continuing incidence of overt sex discrimination in state leave policies. As the court of appeals
observed, "the legislative history of the FMLA contains substantial evidence of gender
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discrimination with respect to the granting of leave to state employees, and ... it therefore
justifies the enactment of the FMLA as a prophylactic measure." Pet. App. 20a. The court
pointed to studies in the legislative history
show[ing] significant gender-based disparities in the coverage of state leave
policies. They thus indicate widespread intentional gender discrimination by
states. Moreover, the studies show that this discrimination has persisted despite
the existence of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Title VII, long after the 1978 enactment of
the Pregnancy Discrimination Act made discrimination on the basis of pregnancy
an actionable form of gender discrimination under Title VII. Altogether then, the
studies show that states' discriminatory leave policies are just the sort of difficult
and intractable problem that justifies broad prophylactic measures in response.
Pet. App. 21a.
Second, in adopting section 2612(a)(1)(C), Congress was also prompted in part by equal
protection problems associated with the fact that many employers (including Nevada and most
other States) offered no entitlement to family medical leave. 25 The absence of a right to family
leave, while not facially sex-based, raised extant and potential equal protection problems to
which section 2612(a)(1)(C) responded.
25 At the time of the FMLA's passage, 32 states lacked any law applicable to state
employees that conferred a right to family medical leave (as distinct from pregnancy disability or
parental leave). Of the 18 states that had family medical leave policies, all but one (Illinois,
enacted in 1983) were enacted after 1987 when the FMLA's immediate precursors were already
under consideration in Congress. See ALASKASTAT. § 23.10.500-.550 (enacted 1992); CAL.
GOV'T CODE § 12945.2 (enacted 1991); P7-4-12, 4 COLO.CODEPEGS. § 801-2 (6-91) (enacted
1987); CONN.GEN. STAT. § 5-248a, 248b (enacted 1988); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 110.221 (enacted
1991); CA. CODE ANN. § 45-24 (enacted 1992); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 79-32, 398-1 to -10
(enacted 1991); ILL. COMP.STAT. 415/8C (enacted 1983); ME. REV. STAT.ANN. tit. 26, §§ 843-
849 (enacted 1988); N.J. STAT.ANN. § 34:11B-1 to-16 (enacted 1989); N.D. CENT.CODE§ 54-
52.4 (enacted 1989); OKLA. STAT. tit. 74, § 840.7C (enacted 1989); OR. REV. STAT. § 659.560-
.570 (enacted 1992); R.I. GEN. LAWS§ 28-48-1 to -10 (enacted 1990); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21,
§§ 470-474 (enacted 1991); WASH. REV. CODE § 49.78.010-.901 (enacted 1989); WIS. STAT.
§ 103.10 (enacted 1987). Moreover, the few states that did begin offering family medical leave
once the FMLA was under consideration had not only failed previously to provide family
medical leave, but also provided no pregnancy disability, maternity or paternity leave rights (see,
e.g., Oklahoma, Maine, West Virginia), or provided only pregnancy disability leave for women,
with no family leave for either sex (see, e.g., California, Connecticut, Florida, Hawaii, New
Jersey, Oregon, Rhode Island, Vermont, Washington).
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When employees lacked a right to family medical leave, purely discretionary family
leave decisions were often infected by the prevalent sex-based assumptions identified above
regarding differential male and female family leave needs. Employers use their discretion to be
more generous in granting leave to women than to men, based on a general perception that
women bear greater family responsibilities and so have a more pressing need than do men to take
time off from work in order to provide family care. Extending greater leave opportunities to
women than to similarly situated men due to sex-based assumptions about differential needs--
rather than actual, sex-neutral evaluation of needs in individual cases--violates men's equal
protection rights.
No-leave state policies also imposed a disproportionate adverse impact on women which,
in this context, violated equal protection. The court of appeals found ample support for section
2612(a)(1)(C)'s remedial character in the fact that it was "designed to undo the impact of [a]
history of state-supported and mandated sex discrimination as it continues to affect public and
private employment." Pet. App. 23a. Although disparate impact on women does not, taken
alone, violate equal protection, see Personnel Administrator v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979),
where, as here, the disparity is a continuing effect of past intentional discrimination, it is
unconstitutional, id. at 272 (a neutral law with a disproportionate adverse impact on a protected
class violates equal protection where "that impact can be traced to a discriminatory purpose").
Because the history of pervasive state-sponsored sex discrimination substantially contributed to
the current discriminatory effect of a facially sex-neutral failure to grant family medical leave,
remedying that discriminatory effect is well within Congress's power under § 5. See Boerne,
521 U.S. at 526 (citing with approval reasoning of Brennan, J., in Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S.
112, 235 (1970), that facially neutral literacy requirements which the Court previously upheld
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against equal protection challenge could be barred by Fourteenth Amendment legislation because
the literacy requirements' discriminatory effects resulted from previous unconstitutional
governmental discrimination in education).
The court of appeals relied on the FMLA's legislative history recounting "the harmful
and extant effects of [state-supported] stereotypical gender roles on women's participation in the
workforce," including the fact that working women were disproportionately likely to be
caretakers for sick relatives, and were often forced to quit their jobs to care for their relatives.
Pet. App. 33a-34a (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 103-8(1) at 24 (1993); S. Rep. No. 102-68 at 28
(1991)). The court also catalogued a history of explicit sex-based classifications in state law,
including maximum-hour and minimum-wage laws and night work prohibitions for women but
not men, various restrictions on the types of tasks or occupations in which women could
participate, and sex-based restrictions on employment benefits for widowers that did not equally
apply to widows. Pet. App. 24a-28a. 26 By the time Congress took up the subject of job-
protected family medical leave,
[s]tate support for stereotypical gender roles had allowed American employers--
including the states--to develop and function without accommodating workers'
home responsibilities during emergencies. Because women filled the caretaking
role during times of crisis, men were expected to continue their work without
interruption from domestic responsibilities. And, even as women entered the
workplace in greater numbers, the continuing expectation that women would
assume responsibility for domestic concerns put a burden on both working
women and working men, hindering women's ability to compete equally in the
marketplace while making it difficult to recast family responsibilities by sharing
critical responsibilities at home.
26 Contrary to petitioners' suggestion, Pet. 21, these judicial decisions are relevant whether
or not Congress explicitly cited them. See Garrett, 531 U.S. at 376 (Kennedy, J., concurring);
South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 311-12 (1966) (reviewing prior Fifteenth
Amendment litigation in this Court as relevant support for the Voting Rights Act provisions
under that amendment's enforcement clause).
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Pet. App. 31a-32a. The court noted that the FMLA's text and history "quite explicitly reflect this
same understanding of the historical dynamic, and an intent to change it." ld. at 32a (citing 29
U.S.C. § 2601(a)(5); H.R. Rep. No. 103-8(I), at 16-17 (1993); S. Rep. No. 102-68, at 37 (1991));
see also The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1987: Joint Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Labor-Management Relations and the Subcomm. on Labor Standards of the Comm. on
Education and Labor, 100th Cong. (1987) (statement of Donna Lenhoff).
Congress in the FMLA addressed discrimination by States and private sector employers
alike. 27 Such express congressional focus on public as well as private employers sharply
distinguishes section 2612(a)(1)(C) from other laws this Court has held are not valid exercises of
Congress's section 5 power. The Court in Garren stressed that Congress expressly limited its
employment-discrimination findings in the ADA to "the private sector." Garren, 531 U.S. at
371-72. The Court concluded that "Congress' failure to mention the States in its legislative
findings addressing discrimination in employment reflects that body's judgment that no pattern
of unconstitutional state action has been documented." Id. at 372. The evidence of state
discrimination in the legislative record could not suffice to overcome the clear implication of the
statutory findings that the challenged ADA provision responded only to private-sector
discrimination. By contrast, in enacting the FMLA Congress addressed patterns of leave
discrimination common to both public and private sector employers.
27 Congress received compelling evidence that public-sector employees were faring no
better than their private-sector counterparts. See, e.g., The Parental and Medical Leave Act of
1986: Joint Hearing on H.R. 4300 Before the Subcomm. on Labor-Management Relations and
the Subcomm. on Labor Standards of the House Comm. on Education and Labor, 99th Cong. 30
(1986) (statement of Meryl Frank, Yale Bush Center) ("public sector leaves don't vary very
much from private sector leaves"); id. at 90 (statement of Barbara Easterling, Communications
Workers of America) (unions representing both private- and public-sector employees reached the
same conclusion regarding their "public and private sector members"); 139 Cong. Rec. H399
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As the court of appeals noted, it is of paramount importance here that the FMLA, unlike
the statutes at issue in Kimel, Garrett, and Florida Prepaid, is aimed at remedying sex
discrimination, which is subject to heightened constitutional scrutiny. Cf Kirnel v. Florida
Board of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 88 (2000) (emphasizing that age classifications, unlike those
based on sex or race, are not subject to heightened judicial scrutiny, and explaining that "[s]trong
[prophylactic legislative] measures appropriate to address one harm may be an unwarranted
response to another, lesser one"). 28 In applying heightened constitutional scrutiny to sex-based
distinctions, this Court has itself taken judicial notice of the pervasiveness of sex discrimination
in governmental decision making, and has also relied on Congress's competence in identifying
patterns of invidious discrimination. See Virginia, 518 U.S. at 531 ("Today's skeptical scrutiny
of official action denying rights or opportunities based on sex responds to volumes of history.");
J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 136 ("our nation has had a long an unfortunate history of sex discrimination, a
history which warrants the heightened scrutiny we afford all gender-based classifications today")
(internal quotation and citation omitted); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 685-86 (1973)
(plurality) (taking note that "women still face pervasive, although at times more subtle,
discrimination in our national institutions, in the job market and, perhaps most conspicuously, in
the political arena," and recounting Congress's role in identifying and remedying sex
discrimination). Just as this Court is empowered to observe the nature and breadth of the
(dally ed. Feb. 3, 1993) (remarks of Rep. Bishop) (recounting receiving complaints from people
"who were employed in State government and who were employed in the private sector").
28 Petitioners find it "baffling" (Pet. 23) that the court of appeals below did not cite United
States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000), which considered whether legislation aimed at
remedying sex discrimination was appropriate under section 5. The Court in Morrison did not,
however, question the assertions in that case of pervasive gender-motivated bias in state justice
systems, but held that the statute was not appropriate section 5 legislation because it was directed
at private persons, not state actors. See id. at 619-26.
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problem of sex discrimination in general terms as a justification for applying heightened judicial
scrutiny to respond to it, so, too, is Congress warranted in enacting remedial and prophylactic
legislation based on its accumulated understanding of the historic and continuing function of sex-
role stereotypes in perpetuating unconstitutional sex discrimination in employment and leave
decisions, without providing detailed documentation in the legislative history of a widespread
pattern of state sex discrimination in family medical leave. In any event, a "lack of support in
the legislative record is not determinative" so long as the targeted constitutional "wrong or evil"
is identified to the Court. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board v. College
Savings Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 646 (1999). There is simply no question, in light of Congress's
express findings as well as the legislative history, that Congress identified a problem of
unconstitutional sex discrimination and enacted section 2612(a)(1)(C) to remedy and prevent that
discrimination.
The remedy Congress chose was a sex-neutral requirement that an employer hold an
employee's job open for the time (up to 12 weeks) during which the employee needs to be absent
to care for a sick family member. That remedy is congruent and proportional to the equal
protectio n problems Congress addressed. The remedy is sex-neutral, because, as is so often the
case with equal protection problems, both men and women suffered distinct kinds of harm from
the discrimination Congress identified. Men's leave needs were taken less seriously than
women's under discretionary policies, but women nonetheless were especially burdened by the
lack of a fight to leave. Congress feared, however, that providing leave rights to women only
would "have serious potential for encouraging employers to discriminate" against them. 29
U.S.C. § 2601(a)(6). Doing so also would not be "consistent with the Equal Protection Clause,"
because, where a sex-neutral remedy served as well or better, denying the same rights to
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similarly situated men would be unconstitutional, ld. § 2601(b)(4). The FMLA's creation of a
sex-neutral, unpaid, and voluntary family leave entitlement is an especially fitting response to
sex discrimination, because it ensures that employees have the opportunity to depart from
traditional sex roles without insisting that they do so.
Congress acted appropriately in adopting a nationally uniform statute. Contrary to
petitioners' suggestions, Pet. 15-16, 22-23, section 5 legislation does not "require[]... geographic
restrictions." Boerne, 521 U.S. at 533. Indeed, even though more that 30 States lacked literacy
requirements at the time, the Voting Rights Act's prohibition of English literacy requirements
upheld in Katzenbach v. Morgan applied nationwide. 384 U.S. 641,643 n.1,654 n.15 (1966).
Unlike some of the forms of racial discrimination in voting addressed through geographically
focused provisions of the Voting Rights Act, see South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301
(1966), the sex discrimination that the FMLA targets is not a regional phenomenon. The
evidence in the legislative history and this Court's own cases instead reflects sex-based attitudes
and practices that pervade our national culture, and are not particularly tied to political
geography. 29
Petitioner's objection to Congress "us[ing] its enforcement power to create an
entitlement" as opposed to a "prohibition" (Pet. 17) misses the mark, because Congress
undeniably has Commerce Clause power to create the entitlement, and must rely on its section 5
power only to provide for damages against state employers. Moreover, section 2612(a)(1)(C)
29 Additionally, Congress's desire to work cooperatively with the States calls for a uniform
remedy. The National Conference of State Legislatures endorsed the FMLA early in the
legislative process. See The Parental and Medical Leave Act of 1987: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Children, Families, Drugs and Alcoholism of the Senate Comm. on Labor and
Human Resources, Part 2, 100th Cong. 305 (1987) (statement of Roberta Lynch, AFSCME,
referring to NCSL endorsement). It would have been out of keeping with the spirit of federal-
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does not mandate that employers grant a "fixed ... benefit" of 12 weeks of family medical leave,
Pet. 22, but only requires that employers permit as much time off as is actually needed to care for
a family member's serious health condition, up to an annual ceiling of 12 weeks. See 29 U.S.C.
§ 2613. The FMLA guarantees only that an employer will hold the employee's job and continue
to pay benefits if an employee demonstrably needs, and is willing to take, unpaid leave, ld. §
2612(c).
The 12-week ceiling in the FMLA is not arbitrary and intrusive, Pet. 17-18, 22, but was
carefully drawn with substantial input from public and private employers as unlikely to impose
significant burdens on employers, while still providing a meaningful amount of job-protected
leave to employees. 3° Congress noted evidence that granting such unpaid leave would result in
cost savings from decreased turnover, hiring and training of replacements, and that the net cost to
employers of providing job-protected unpaid leave could be as inexpensive as $5.30 to $6.70 per
employee per year.31 The congressionally mandated follow-up study on experience with the
FMLA showed a median length of FMLA leave of 10 days, and that 80 per cent of leaves
pursuant to the FMLA were for 40 days or fewer. The study reported that the vast majority of
employers in fact experienced little or no cost from FMLA compliance. Commission on Leave,
state cooperation in support of the FMLA to point fingers at any subset of states as particularly
culpable.
30 That kind of empirically based judgment in the fashioning of legislative remedies is
particularly within congressional competence and is entitled to deference. See Turner
Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 665 (1994); Walters v. National Ass'n of
Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305,331 n. 12 (1985).
31 See S. Rep. No. 103-3, at 16-18 (1993); The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1991:
Hearing on S. 5 Before the Subcomm. on Children, Family, Drugs and Alcoholism of the Senate
Comm on Labor and Human Resources, 102d Cong. 12, 13, 23, 35, 91 (1991); see also S. Rep.
No. 103-3, at 14 (describing survey of a handful of States that did have family and medical leave
laws, which revealed that "sizable majorities of covered employers reported that the State laws
were neither costly nor burdensome to implement.").
31
United States Department of Labor, A Workable Balance: Report to Congress on Family and
Medical Lea ve Policies 125-26 (1996); see also Balancing the Needs of Families and Employers,
Family and Medical Leave Surveys, 6-13 (2000 Update). 32
The FMLA's 12-week standard is easily understood and administered. Petitioners'
attempt to draw an analogy between "the substantial costs" imposed on States by the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act remedies invalidated in Boerne and section 2612(a)(1)(C) of the
FMLA, Pet. 18, is badly exaggerated. That comparison only underscores how slight is the
impact of the right to unpaid family medical leave. This Court observed in Boerne that RFRA's
"sweeping coverage ensures its intrusion at every level of government, displacing laws and
prohibiting official actions of almost every description and regardless of subject matter." 521
U.S. at 532. RFRA applies to every state agency and all state laws and decisions. Its "'stringent
test" requires States to demonstrate a compelling governmental interest and that the challenged
approach is the least restrictive means of furthering that interest, a test triggered by a threshold
claim of a "substantial burden" on the exercise of religion--a claim that is often highly
contextual and "difficult to contest." Boerne, 521 U.S. at 533-534. The FMLA, by contrast, sets
a clear and easily administered standard for the maximum amount of job-protected unpaid leave
covered employees may expect to take for family care in any given year. Given the validity of
Title VII, which imposes both disparate-treatment and disparate-impact standards, as legislation
enforcing the equal protection prohibition against sex discrimination in employment in general,
32 Several other features of the FMLA tailor it so as to minimize burdens on employers,
including states. The Act exempts employees who have not worked for the employer for at least
12 months and a minimum of 1,250 hours, 29 U.S.C. § 2611(2)(A), as well as certain highly
compensated employees, id. § 2614(b), and employees in certain high-level or sensitive
positions, id. §§ 2611(3), 203(e)(2)(C). The Act requires employees, where feasible, to give
employers advance notice of their leave needs and make efforts to minimize any disruption of
32
see generally Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976), the constitutionality of the narrowly
fashioned and minimally burdensome FMLA remedy follows afortiori.
the employer's operations, id. § 2612(e), and, where requested, to provide information to
substantiate the family member's serious health condition, id. § 2613.
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CONCLUSION
The petition for a writ of certiorari should be denied.
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